BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATOR
SECTIONS 6-7
SECTIONS 6-7
SECTIONS 6-7
SECTIONS 6-7
SECTIONS 6-7
SECTIONS 6-7
LSPU College of Law
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
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MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. For which the honourable court admitted to probate the alleged last will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to probate.
On January 19, 1955 IsmaelaDimagiba submitted to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a petition for the probate of Will of the deceased Benedicta Delos Reyes. She alleged that the Will of the deceased was executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the will. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After the trial in the Court of First Instance, it is found out the purported will was genuine and properly executed and admitted to probate by the honourable court. Then, the oppositors of the will filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial, they insisted for the reconsideration of estoppel and revocation be resolved. Then on July 07, 1959 the trial court overruled the claim that the proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will.
And after the trial court received further evidence, the purported sale in favor of the proponent, the will of the late Benedicta delos Reyes “unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale”. Aggrieved, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation and affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative.
The probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The appealed decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.